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Casino Gambling In Atlantic City: A Sure Bet For Whom? |
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Marla K. Nelson
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© & Author Info |
This paper examines the impact of casino gambling as a tool of economic development and urban revitalization in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Focusing on the legal framework in which redevelopment has occurred and the balance of power within the redevelopment partnership, it argues that the consequences of casino-driven growth have not been evenly distributed. Although casino gambling in Atlantic City has created thousands of jobs and generated billions of dollars in tax revenues, it has done little to relieve the city’s high level of unemployment, aid the city’s small businesses, or revitalize the city’s most distressed neighborhoods.
With the exception of casino gambling in Nevada, gaming activity was strictly prohibited throughout the United States prior to 1950. In recent years, however, many states have turned to casino gambling as a quick fix to spur growth and lower unemployment. Currently, casino gambling is legal in 23 states. In light of this trend, it is both interesting and important to examine the impact that casino gambling has had on Atlantic City, New Jersey—the first city in which casino gaming has been used as a tool of urban redevelopment.
The authorization of casino gambling marked a new beginning for Atlantic City and the formation of a public-private partnership between state authorities, local government and the casino industry that has shaped the city’s redevelopment. Casino gambling has transformed Atlantic City from a fading seaside resort to a gaming mecca. While redevelopment efforts have generated a tremendous amount of economic growth, the consequences of this growth have not been evenly distributed.
This paper examines the redevelopment of Atlantic City and the interests it has served. It begins by revisiting Atlantic City’s pre-casino condition. Next, it discusses the legal framework in which redevelopment has occurred. From there it evaluates the redevelopment efforts thus far based on the promises made by casino proponents. It then examines how the balance of power within the development partnership can partially explain the outcomes of Atlantic City’s uneven redevelopment. It concludes by outlining four lessons that can be learned from the Atlantic City experience.
By the 1970s, Atlantic City’s heyday as a premier seaside resort and convention center had long since passed. While the resort still entertained visitors, decades of decline had taken its toll on the town. Those that kept coming to the city were primarily elderly and low-income day-trippers who did little to stimulate Atlantic City’s economy.
Meanwhile, although the city accommodated roughly the same amount of conventioneers as it had a decade earlier, as with non-business tourists, there had been a definitive shift in convention clientele. The high spending businessmen on expense accounts who had long since abandoned Atlantic City were replaced by lower-end conventioneers who bought hot dogs and slept five to a room at very low rates (Pollock 1987: 26). Even if the city had been able to attract upper-end vacationers and business tourists, it lacked the infrastructure to accommodate them. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of available hotel rooms declined by nearly 40 percent (Sternlieb and Hughes 1983: 30).
Atlantic City’s declining tourist industry was accompanied by a fall in the resident population. During the 1970s, when unemployment soared, almost one in five Atlantic City residents fled the city leaving behind the aged and dependent. Between 1970 and 1975 the city lost one in eight jobs from its employment base (Sternlieb and Hughes 1983: 81). As a result of the flight of the middle class and the decrease in economic opportunity, Atlantic City had the highest rate of government aid per capita in the nation with more that 70 percent of the total housing units in the city publicly operated or subsidized (Warker 1988: 37). While many of America’s older urban areas faced similar stories of decline, Atlantic City had been hit particularly hard, earning itself the title of the "South Bronx by the seashore" (Sternlieb and Hughes 1983: 30).
After the failure of federal programs to revitalize the city, casino gambling entered into the discussion of possible remedies. In 1976, New Jersey voters approved a referendum that authorized casino gambling in the city. Billed by the state as a "great experiment" in urban redevelopment, the expectations for casino gambling in Atlantic City were great. First, it was predicted that casino gambling would generate substantial economic growth in the city, the region and throughout the state. Second, casino gambling was expected to expand tax revenues which would be used to target elderly and disabled populations statewide. Finally, it was anticipated that the private investment made by the casino industry would serve public redevelopment ends, particularly in revitalizing Atlantic City’s most distressed neighborhoods.
While the passage of the referendum authorized casino gambling in Atlantic City, enabling legislation established the institutions that would regulate the industry and the legal framework within which casinos would operate. The Casino Control Act, signed in June of 1977, created the New Jersey Casino Control Commission (NJCCC). The NJCCC is an independent agency in but not of the Department of Treasury. As the official casino regulatory agency, the primary functions of the NJCCC are to oversee the operation, development and regulation of the industry.
In addition to the NJCCC, the Casino Control Act established the Casino Revenue Fund. Set up in response to the referendum’s promise to earmark funds for elderly and disabled New Jerseyans, the fund is capitalized by an 8 percent tax imposed on the gross revenue of each casino. The state treasurer disburses the funds to programs authorized by the legislature and the governor.
Whereas the Nevada model was influential in shaping the regulatory and institutional framework that governed gambling in Atlantic City (Warker 1988: 57), New Jersey had no model to emulate in establishing Atlantic City’s redevelopment regulations and institutions. Atlantic City was the first place in which casino gambling was used as a tool of urban redevelopment.
The original reinvestment provision outlined in the Casino Control Act required casinos to invest at least 2 percent of annual gross revenues in the redevelopment of Atlantic City once revenues exceeded a casino’s cumulative investment. Casinos had the option of paying the assessment immediately or delaying payment for up to five years and paying an investment alternative tax. The NJCCC was responsible for determining which investments made by the industry served the public’s redevelopment interest and therefore fulfilled the reinvestment provision. However, the vague reinvestment regulations coupled with a weak institutional design failed to guarantee Atlantic City’s revitalization; casinos tended to delay reinvestment by continuing construction or placing their revenues in high-yielding investments instead. (Bonitto-Doggett 1998; Warker 1988: 77-78)
Realizing that the benefits created by casino gambling would not necessarily "trickle down" to the community as had originally been hoped the state amended the Casino Control Act in 1984 and created the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA). CRDA was charged with facilitating the redevelopment of Atlantic City and municipalities throughout the state. CRDA activities are funded by the Casino Reinvestment Tax, which requires that operating casinos invest 1.25 percent of their gross revenues in the tax fund either through the purchase of bonds issued by CRDA, or through direct investments in or donations to, CRDA approved projects.
During the campaign to authorize casino gambling in Atlantic City, it was predicted that gaming activity would generate substantial economic growth in the resort, the region and throughout the state. The casino-driven growth experienced throughout New Jersey and particularly in Atlantic County has surpassed all expectations. According to NJCCC estimates, the casinos directly employ almost 50,000 people on a full or part time basis (Table 1). One in every three jobs in Atlantic County is in the casino industry.
Table 1: Casino Employment by Place of Residence
As of November 17, 1997
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Casino Employment |
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TOTAL |
48,775 |
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Atlantic County |
38,211 |
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Atlantic City |
11,281 |
Source: Published and unpublished data from the NJCCC
While the casinos employ over 11,000 city residents, roughly half of the local labor force, the city still faces double digit unemployment. In 1976 unemployment in the city was 14.7 percent; in 1997 it hovered at 12.7 percent. (1) Moreover many city residents that work in the casino industry are employed in low wage jobs that offer little opportunity for advancement (Table 2).
Table 2: Percent of Casino Employment by Place of Residence and Employee Type
As of November 17, 1997
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Total |
Key |
Hotel |
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TOTAL |
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
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Atlantic County |
78.3% |
75.4% |
81.4% |
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Atlantic City |
23.1% |
5.4% |
30.4% |
Source: Published and unpublished data from the NJCCC
In addition to job creation, the casinos in Atlantic City have generated business for many state and local enterprises. In 1996, Atlantic City casinos purchased over $1.5 billion worth of goods and services from New Jersey businesses. Atlantic County businesses have received the biggest boost from the local gaming industry. In 1995 the casinos spent more than $965 million within the county (Table 3).
Table 3: Casino Service Industry Total Volume of Business, Calendar Year 1996
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Total Companies |
Percent of Total Companies |
Dollar Volume of Business |
Percent of Total Business |
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Total Number of Vendors |
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Receiving Payments |
8,193 |
100.0% |
$2,471,781,297 |
100.0% |
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New Jersey Enterprises |
3,402 |
41.5% |
1,544,324,764 |
62.5% |
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Atlantic County Enterprises |
1,441 |
17.6% |
965,801,668 |
39.1% |
Source: New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 1998: 52-3.
Although many state businesses have benefited from the casinos, in contrast, many Atlantic City businesses that supported the casino gambling referendum thinking that they would be amongst the beneficiaries of redevelopment have instead fallen victim to the city’s revitalization. Rather than strengthen downtown businesses, the casinos have driven many away. In 1976 there were 2,100 businesses operating within the city; by 1996 the number had been cut in half (Gaby Fisher 1996: 6).
Casino gambling was also expected to expand tax revenues which would be used to assist elderly and disabled populations statewide. Undeniably, this expectation has been fulfilled. According to NJCC estimates (1998), the casinos generate over $300 million annually in taxes for the Casino Revenue Fund. Current programs that receive disbursements from the fund include property tax reductions, utility bill assistance, prescription aid, home health care, and transportation assistance for elderly and disabled citizens.
Finally, it was anticipated that the private investment made by the casino industry would serve public redevelopment ends, particularly in revitalizing Atlantic City’s most distressed neighborhoods. The success of casino gambling has resulted in a considerable amount of subsidized development in Atlantic City and other New Jersey municipalities. As of October 1997, CRDA had committed nearly $787 million to redevelopment projects throughout the state including nearly $672 million in Atlantic City (Table 4; Appendix 1).
Table 4: The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) Projects
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CRDA Financial Commitments |
Percent of Total Commitments |
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TOTAL |
$786,795,513 |
100.0% |
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Atlantic City Corridor Project Total Cost (listed projects) |
280,000,000 |
35.6 |
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Grand Boulevard Development |
-- |
-- |
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Sheraton Convention Center HQ Hotel |
-- |
-- |
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NJT Bus Terminal |
-- |
-- |
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Miss America Rose Walk |
-- |
-- |
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Seaskate Pavilion |
-- |
-- |
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Convention Hall Renovations |
-- |
-- |
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Visitor's Welcome Center |
-- |
-- |
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Atlantic City Housing Projects |
185,035,509 |
23.5 |
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Atlantic City Casino Hotel Expansions |
175,000,001 |
22.2 |
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Atlantic City Non-Housing Projects |
77,464,172 |
9.8 |
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North Jersey Non-housing Projects |
41,155,646 |
5.2 |
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South Jersey Non-Housing Projects |
21,802,396 |
2.8 |
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North Jersey Housing Projects |
4,380,984 |
0.6 |
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South Jersey Housing Projects |
1,956,805 |
0.2 |
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Source: Casino Reinvestment Development Authority; New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 1998: 48-50.
Note: Includes CRDA Projects through October 16, 1997.
However, much of the investment in Atlantic City has been used to develop the tourist infrastructure rather than rebuild neighborhoods. For instance CRDA has committed $175 million to casino hotel expansion projects, $280 million for the Atlantic City Corridor Project (which includes, amongst other things, the development of a "grand boulevard" into the city, a convention center headquarters hotel, and a visitor’s welcome center), and $11.5 million for the Atlantic City baseball stadium.
CRDA has also invested over $185 million in the construction of new low and moderate-income housing (Table 4; Appendix 1). However, the emphasis of CRDA and the few local housing organizations that exist in the city has been on homeownership. The bulk of the newly constructed and rehabilitated units have gone primarily to moderate income families, excluding the city’s low income residents from the benefits of neighborhood redevelopment.
Rather than solve the housing problem for low income residents, casino development has, to some extent, exacerbated it. Rampant speculation has inflated property values and in turn, property taxes. Atlantic City’s property values increased from $319 million in 1975 to about $6.38 billion in 1996. While much of that increase reflects the value of casino properties, there has been a substantial impact on non-casino property as well. The value of non-casino property has jumped more than four-fold from $281.2 million in 1977 to $1.3 billion in 1997 (NJCCC 1998).
Although equalized tax rates have been more than halved since 1977, skyrocketing property values have, in some instances, raised overall tax bills. (2) Some low income homeowners have not been able to afford the increase in property taxes while many landlords have raised rents to cover costs (Sternlieb and Hughes 1983; Warker 1988). As a result, many of the resort’s
low-income residents, particularly senior citizens and minorities have been pushed out of their housing, and the social fabric of the neighborhoods they inhabited has been destroyed. Ironically, like the resort’s small business owners, many of the residents displaced by redevelopment efforts had voted in favor of the referendum with the hope that casino gambling would revitalize their neighborhoods.
Thus far, casino gambling in Atlantic City has generated both winners and losers. For the casino industry, their high level employees, land speculators, and suppliers to the casino industry, the Atlantic City gamble has paid off. However, for many of Atlantic City’s poor and minority residents, casino gambling has not met expectations. Proponents of casino gambling assert that the residents of Atlantic City have expected too much. However, resident expectations were largely shaped by promises made by state and local officials.
It takes time for a city to bounce back from decades of decline. Yet, the uneven redevelopment of Atlantic City has not happened haphazardly. Arguably, some of the negative consequences of Atlantic City’s redevelopment are common outcomes of casino led development, namely the crowding out of local businesses and the creation of low-wage employment with little room for advancement (Cooper 1998; Kindt 1998). In Atlantic City however, the inequitable distribution of redevelopment costs and benefits can, to some extent, be attributed to the balance of power in the redevelopment partnership that has steered the city’s revitalization.
While the Casino Control Act established the public authorities, legal framework, and funding mechanism through which redevelopment could be carried out, there had been no agenda at the outset to determine how redevelopment would occur or how the costs and benefits it produced would be distributed (Bonitto-Doggett 1998; Warker 1988: 276). The lack of clear-cut redevelopment goals was confounded by an adversarial relationship between the state—the NJCCC and elected officials—and the gaming industry. Although the establishment of CRDA in 1984 marked a new era for the rebuilding of the city, in the early years of the agency’s existence, casino operators were given little direct input on CRDA projects. Hence, the industry considered CRDA to be merely another layer of state bureaucracy (Epifanio and Herriott 1996).
The development of a more cooperative alliance between the industry and CRDA began during Jim Florio’s tenure as governor and accelerated when Governor Christine Todd Whitman took office in 1993. During this era of increased cooperation casino operators have been granted more direct control in determining CRDA projects. (3) In 1996 Governor Whitman signed the casino deregulation bill which has allowed CRDA to take a more proactive, aggressive approach to redevelopment in the city (Bonitto-Doggett 1996). The bill granted CRDA the powers of condemnation and eminent domain thus allowing it to seize private property for the purpose of turning it over to a private developer.
CRDA’s bias towards private interests has been reinforced through a historically weak local government and the lack of community participation. Atlantic City boasts a legacy of ineffective, corrupt leadership that has contributed to the mismatch between the private and local public sectors. Four of the last 8 mayors have been removed from office and 3 of the 4 have served prison sentences.
Many long time residents distrust the government and the industry. The skepticism and frustration felt by many of the resort’s residents is summed up in the following quote by Pierre Hollingsworth, retired Atlantic City fire chief and former president of the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP):
Will more casinos make the difference? How? You have 13 now and you still have run-down neighborhoods everywhere. Atlantic Avenue is dead as a doornail. Pacific Avenue is shot. And you still have double-digit unemployment. That’s how much casinos have helped Atlantic City so far. What are five or six more going to do for the people who live here because nobody cares about the people who live here (quoted in Gaby Fisher 1996: 6).
This distrust has dissuaded active public participation in Atlantic City’s redevelopment and created what Bonitto-Doggett (1998) considers an attitude on the part of city residents that they are planned for rather than involved in the planning process. (4)
The Atlantic City case offers valuable lessons to planners and policy makers interested in casino gambling as a redevelopment tool. First, and perhaps foremost, it is necessary to develop a clear and concise master plan for how casino dollars will be spent. The lack of well-defined reinvestment regulations and poor partnering between Atlantic City’s redevelopment institutions and the casino industry wasted years in rebuilding the city. The grandeur and wealth of the casinos abutting the squalor of poor neighborhoods stood as a testament of the fallacious promises of casino led redevelopment and served to discourage other jurisdictions from attempting such redevelopment schemes (Bonitto-Doggett 1998; Rich 1990). However, once CRDA and the Casino Reinvestment Tax were established and CRDA joined forces with the casino industry, redevelopment in the city took off.
Despite the strides that have been made in Atlantic City’s resurgence, the consequences of redevelopment have not been equally distributed. This brings us to the next lesson to be learned from Atlantic City. It is necessary to involve the community as stakeholders to find out what the redevelopment priorities of the community are and how it stands to be affected by casino development. (Bonitto-Doggett 1998). Third, development officials need to ensure career advancement programs for minorities who start out in entry-level positions. As the figures for Atlantic City indicate, most of the city residents employed by the casinos work in low-wage jobs with little chance of getting ahead. A final recommendation to promote more equitable casino-led development is to break down some large casino supply contracts so that small, locally owned businesses can benefit as suppliers. (Wilson and Linsalata 1996).
By traditional growth measures casino gambling in Atlantic City has been an unquestioned success. The casinos have created nearly 50,000 jobs and generated billions of dollars in tax revenues. Moreover, casino gambling has put Atlantic City back on the map as a tourist destination, attracting well over 34 million visitors a year. One needs only to compare Atlantic City to crumbling seaside resorts elsewhere in the United States to get a better understanding of the city’s resurgence. However, state and local development officials that are looking towards casino gambling as a cure-all for economic decline should proceed with caution and make efforts to ensure a more equitable distribution of the consequences of casino-led growth. As the displacement of local businesses and poor residents, persistent unemployment and remaining urban distress in Atlantic City remind us, casino gambling is not always a sure bet.
1. While the levels of unemployment in Atlantic City may be comparable, the type of unemployment city residents experience (long-term vs. short-term) may have changed.
2. It is worth noting that between 1977 and 1997, the Atlantic City tax rate dropped drastically from $7.955 to $2.949 per $100 assessed value (NJCCC 1998: 23). However, the decrease in tax rates has not made up for skyrocketing property values, and thus, overall tax bills have risen in many cases.
3. In the 1993 amendment to the Casino Control Act the original language that defined CRDA’s function, leaving the authority’s role a lot less clearly defined and open to interpretation. As a result of the legislative amendment, CRDA was no longer directly responsible for addressing the social and economic needs of those who lived in Atlantic City’s blighted neighborhoods. During that same year the casino industry received two voting seats on the CRDA board. Prior to 1993, industry representatives did not have voting privileges. The presence of industry representatives on the board has intensified the CRDA’s focus on infrastructure improvements rather than on neighborhood development.
4. This is not to suggest that the redevelopment of Atlantic City has been devoid of citizen participation. Some projects have generated a considerable amount of community action. However much of this involvement has been in reaction to rather than in devising redevelopment plans.
The Casino Redevelopment Authority (CRDA) Projects
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Projects |
CRDA Financial Commitments |
Percent of Total Commitments |
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|
TOTAL |
$786,795,513 |
100.0% |
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Atlantic City Housing Projects |
185,035,509 |
23.5 |
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3-2-1 Police Officer Neighborhood Stabilization Program |
5,000,000 |
0.6 |
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Bally's Hope Loan Program |
1,000,000 |
0.1 |
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Citywide Housing Rehabilitation Program |
3,500,000 |
0.4 |
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Gardners Landing |
1,389,400 |
0.2 |
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Grammercy Park |
2,200,000 |
0.3 |
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Habitat for Humanity |
300,000 |
0.0 |
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Home Buyers Loan Program |
1,500,000 |
0.2 |
|
|
Jacobs Family Terrace |
12,464,843 |
1.6 |
|
|
Landmark Group Rental Housing Rehabilitation |
880,000 |
0.1 |
|
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NJIT Housing Demonstration Park |
1,925,540 |
0.2 |
|
|
Harbour Pointe |
53,352,591 |
6.8 |
|
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The Cove at Gardners Basin |
28,231,091 |
3.6 |
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|
Madison Landing |
3,712,100 |
0.5 |
|
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Northwest Inlet Rehabilitation |
3,307,100 |
0.4 |
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One North Boston Avenue |
2,680,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Regency & Victorian Court I & II |
39,665,124 |
5.0 |
|
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South Jersey Aids Alliance Transitional Home |
250,000 |
0.0 |
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Vermont Plaza |
21,000,000 |
2.7 |
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Vision 2000 |
2,677,720 |
0.3 |
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|
|
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Atlantic City Corridor Project Total Cost (listed projects) |
280,000,000 |
35.6 |
|
|
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Grand Boulevard Development |
-- |
-- |
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Sheraton Convention Center HQ Hotel |
-- |
-- |
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NJT Bus Terminal |
-- |
-- |
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Miss America Rose Walk |
-- |
-- |
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Seaskate Pavilion |
-- |
-- |
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Convention Hall Renovations |
-- |
-- |
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Visitor's Welcome Center |
-- |
-- |
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Projects |
CRDA Financial Commitments |
Percent of Total Commitments |
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Atlantic City Non-Housing Projects |
$77,464,172 |
9.8% |
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Absecon Lighthouse |
970,000 |
0.1 |
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A.C. Jitney Minority Loan Program |
1,400,000 |
0.2 |
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A.C. Medical Center Trauma Center |
1,787,503 |
0.2 |
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A.C. Minor League Baseball Stadium |
11,550,000 |
1.5 |
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A.C. Rescue Mission |
866,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
Albany Avenue Beautification |
510,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
Beron Jewish Older Adult Services Pavilion |
1,350,000 |
0.2 |
|
|
Brigantine Homes Playground |
25,000 |
0.0 |
|
|
Bungalow Park Community Center |
2,500 |
0.0 |
|
|
Carnegie Library Plaza |
2,034,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Citywide Demolition |
6,000,000 |
0.8 |
|
|
Delaware Avenue Widening |
8,000,000 |
1.0 |
|
|
Dr. Martin Luther King Blvd. Beautification |
2,500,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Ducktown Corridor Beautification |
1,273,569 |
0.2 |
|
|
Fifth Ward Beautification |
2,700,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Forest City Ratner Entertainment Complex |
5,000,000 |
0.6 |
|
|
Historic Gardners Basin Marine Education Center |
3,175,000 |
0.4 |
|
|
Kentucky Avenue Arts |
75,000 |
0.0 |
|
|
Marina District Corridor Beautification |
5,475,000 |
0.7 |
|
|
Massachusetts Avenue Plan |
1,819,800 |
0.2 |
|
|
New Life Development Center Day Care |
59,800 |
0.0 |
|
|
Pop Lloyd Stadium |
297,000 |
0.0 |
|
|
Renaissance Plaza Supermarket & Retail Complex |
8,100,000 |
1.0 |
|
|
Second Ward Community Development |
6,500,000 |
0.8 |
|
|
Showboat Parking Lot |
1,201,000 |
0.2 |
|
|
Special Improvement District Streetscaping |
3,025,000 |
0.4 |
|
|
Youth Build Program |
1,768,000 |
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Atlantic City Casino Hotel Expansions |
$175,000,001 |
22.2% |
|
|
|
A.C. Hilton |
12,474,000 |
1.6 |
|
|
Bally's Park Place |
2,794,500 |
0.4 |
|
|
Caesar's Atlantic City |
30,025,061 |
3.8 |
|
|
Harrah's Casino Hotel |
43,200,083 |
5.5 |
|
|
Resorts/Sun International Casino Hotel |
27,305,893 |
3.5 |
|
|
Sands Casino Hotel |
9,101,964 |
1.2 |
|
|
Showboat /casino Hotel |
11,502,000 |
1.5 |
|
|
Tropicana Casino & Resort |
24,462,000 |
3.1 |
|
|
Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino |
14,134,500 |
1.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
South Jersey Housing Projects |
1,956,805 |
0.2 |
|
|
|
Burlington County Housing Rehabilitation |
96,738 |
0.0 |
|
|
Lumberton Independent Living Center |
1,860,067 |
0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
South Jersey Non-Housing Projects |
21,802,396 |
2.8 |
|
|
|
ARC Training Facility - Lakewood |
516,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
Day Care Center - Lakewood |
525,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
GE Aerospace Facility - Camden |
1,932,496 |
0.2 |
|
|
Kemi Manufacturing Plan - Camden |
5,000,000 |
0.6 |
|
|
Mercer County Waterfront Park - Trenton |
2,000,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Roebling Complex - Trenton |
3,293,900 |
0.4 |
|
|
Serendipity Supermarket - Wilingboro |
625,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
Sony Pace Waterfront Amphitheater - Camden |
3,000,000 |
0.4 |
|
|
South Jersey Agricultural Loan Program |
3,000,000 |
0.4 |
|
|
Tukerton Seaport |
330,000 |
0.0 |
|
|
Woodbury Child Development Center |
880,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
YMCA - Hamilton |
700,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
North Jersey Housing Projects |
4,380,984 |
0.6 |
|
|
|
Clifton Grove Hill Estates |
2,987,291 |
0.4 |
|
|
North Oraton Homes - East Orange |
1,393,693 |
0.2 |
|
Projects |
CRDA Financial Commitments |
Percent of Total Commitments |
|
|
North Jersey Non-housing Projects |
$41,155,646 |
5.2% |
|
|
|
Catholic Community Facility Headquarters - Newark |
2,500,000 |
0.3 |
|
|
Children's Day Nursery - Passaic |
502,500 |
0.1 |
|
|
Marcal Extraction Facility - Elmwood Park |
25,500,000 |
3.2 |
|
|
Mi Bandera Market - Union City |
724,419 |
0.1 |
|
|
Morristown Theater |
1,750,000 |
0.2 |
|
|
NEDC Parking Garage - Newark |
900,000 |
0.1 |
|
|
New Jersey Performing Arts Center - Newark |
5,000,000 |
0.6 |
|
|
YMCA of Passaic NJ |
50,000 |
0.0 |
|
|
NJ Vietnam Veterans Memorial & Educational Center - Holmdel |
3,750,000 |
0.5 |
|
|
West NY Recreation |
478,727 |
0.1 |
Bonitto-Doggett, Yvonne. 1996. Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, Deputy Director. Phone interview, December 10.
___________. 1998. Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, Deputy Director. Interview, Atlantic City, November 13.
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__________. 1996. 1995 Annual Report. Atlantic City, NJ: Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.
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